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Notes
Towards an Explicit Balancing Inquiry? R.A. V.
and BLACK Through the Lens of Foreign
Freedom of Expression Jurisprudence
MATTHEW S. MELAMED*

INTRODUCTION

This Note addresses the emergent balancing inquiry currently
providing implicit structure to recent United States Supreme Court
decisions on the constitutionality of cross-burning bans, as exemplified in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul' and Virginia v. Black In many ways, cross
burning defines one boundary of First Amendment protection. The line
between hate speech, which is protected because of its political nature,
and true threats, which are not protected, is tenuously drawn in decisions
like those in R.A.V. and Black. Though these decisions are influenced by
the doctrine of categorical balancing,3 where the line is drawn inevitably
depends on the perspective of the person drawing it. While principles of
categorical balancing remain important, this Note argues that the R.A. V.
and Black decisions are the result of the Court moving away from
categorical balancing and towards a case-by-case balancing inquiry with
respect to First Amendment protection. The extent to which implicit
case-by-case balancing influenced the decisions in R.A.V. and Black can
be seen by examining these cases through the lens of foreign balancing
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.A., Wesleyan
University, 1996. Thanks to Jacco Bomhoff, Faculty of Law at the University of Leiden (Netherlands)
and participants in his Fall 20o6 Comparative Rights Adjudication seminar at Hastings College of the
Law for their feedback during the development of this Note. Thanks also to Professor Ashutosh
Bhagwat at Hastings College of the Law for his guidance.
i. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
2. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
3. For a definition of "categorical balancing," see Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and
Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 74-75 (2004)
(describing a "'categorical' approach" as one "pursuant to which rigid guidelines are established ex
ante, in order to determine which categories of expression are protected and which are not").
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jurisprudence, in particular that of the European Court of Human Rights
("European Court") and the Canadian Constitutional Court ("Canadian
Court").
By way of introduction, it is necessary to briefly discuss generally
what can be gained by examining U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
through the lens of foreign constitutional adjudication. First, as Professor
Pierre Lepaulle noted, "To see things in their true light, we must see
them from a certain distance, as strangers. '4 Looking at foreign
constitutional jurisprudence enables the scholar of American law to see
and understand U.S. constitutional jurisprudence more clearly and
deeply. This is perhaps particularly true of free speech, which is so
fundamental to our legal system and national identity that it is difficult to
truly understand absent comparative consideration. Second, even if one
rejects the concept of comparing U.S. constitutional adjudication with
other constitutional traditions, the reality is that we cannot avoid doing
so. As Professor Vicki Jackson explains:
Comparison is inevitable. We cannot help but draw on
comparisons with other systems in understanding and giving
meaning to our own. . . . In formulating answers to U.S.
constitutional questions, an implicit part of our arguing about
and deciding these decisions has to do with assumptions of what
U.S. constitutionalism is about and what it requires; and this
analysis involves an implicit comparison with other forms of
constitutionalism.5
Part I of this Note identifies the historical antipathy towards
balancing inspired by the First Amendment, simultaneously considering
the jurisprudential failure of First Amendment fundamentalism and the
powerful ideological hold that it still exerts. Part II introduces the
motivation and means by which the European Court and the Canadian
Court use explicit balancing tests in freedom of expression adjudication.
Part III examines the decisions in R.A.V. and Black, revealing the extent
to which balancing inquiries already inform modern First Amendment
jurisprudence. In Part IV, an explicit First Amendment balancing test is
proposed, based on the implicit reasoning employed in R.A. V. and Black,
and informed by the European and Canadian adjudicative models. In so
doing, reasons for adopting an explicit balancing test are discussed, and
anticipated objections to a balancing test are briefly addressed.
I.

THE FALSEHOOD OF FIRST AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALISM

Justice Black's distaste for judicial balancing in First Amendment
4. Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of ComparativeLaw, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838, 858 (1922).

5. Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:Opening Up the
Conversation on "Proportionality,"Rights and Federalism, IU. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 6OO-oi (1999).
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adjudication, expressed in his dissenting opinion in Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, is an expression of what I refer to as "First
Amendment fundamentalism."
[T]he First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to
be done in this field.6
Whether or not the unequivocal command of the First Amendment
shows that the framers intended the Amendment to be evaluated solely
on its face, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
Amendment otherwise. As explained by Justice Harlan in writing for the
Konigsberg majority, the "Court has consistently recognized at least two
ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower
than an unlimited license to talk."7 Historically, the Court has excluded
certain categories of speech from the scope of First Amendment
protections.8 The Court has also upheld regulatory statutes that
incidentally limit the freedom of speech when they "have been found
justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to
constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the
governmental interest[s] involved."9 The first narrowing is categorical;
the second, the result of contextualized balancing. Despite the
vehemence of Black's dissent and the textual basis on which it stands,
Harlan's majority opinion maps the Court's history of First Amendment
jurisprudence, and is a statement of the principles that continue to guide
the Court today.'" Black's dissent, which protests what he sees as a
balancing away of First Amendment freedoms, remains a powerful
model of judicial clarity." In Black's opinion, there are no troublesome
categorical considerations necessary; speech is truly, and wholly, free.'2
Despite Black's dissent and the plain language of the First
Amendment, First Amendment adjudication -even in cases where the
6. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (i96i) (Black, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 49-50 (majority opinion).
8. Id. Legal scholars use the word "categorical" to refer to different ideas in the context of
constitutional adjudication. The body of legal scholarship concerning "categorical" approaches by
courts is massive and scholars are often using the word to different effect, resulting in a scholarship
that is talking in skewed lines. For purposes of this Note, unless otherwise mentioned, "categorical"
decisionmaking is a mode of judging based on figuring out whether a given restriction on the freedom
of expression fits into a predefined categorical exception to the First Amendment, and if so, into which
category it fits. This definition necessarily implies the question of how the pre-existing categories are
defined, which is briefly discussed in Part IV.
9. ld. at 50-5t.
io. Id. at 5o-56.
is. Id. at 61 (Black, J. dissenting).
12. See id. ("I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no
abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of
Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field.").
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speech is categorically excluded from the Amendment's protection-is
accomplished by "the employment of balancing tests, often under the
guise of categorization, rather than balancing."' 3 While Harlan only
acknowledged a balancing inquiry in the context of government
regulatory statutes that incidentally limit free speech,' 4 balancing under
the guise of categorization is also used to exclude certain types of speech
and expression from First Amendment protection. "[E]ven critics of
balancing almost inevitably discover that they must sometimes resort to
it," explains Professor Beschle, who argues that judges who criticize
balancing employ "semantic gymnastics" to hide the balancing nature of
their inquiry. 5 Such semantic gymnastics, I argue, have also made it
difficult for the Court to develop a clear First Amendment jurisprudence.
While "freedom of speech" is a foundational tenet of American cultural
and political identity, those who claim its protections often share Black's
belief that the First Amendment is an unequivocal command that no
speech shall be abridged, ignorant of the Court's more confusing
definition.
II. FOREIGN MODELS OF FREE SPEECH ADJUDICATION
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court's partial facade of First
Amendment categorical balancing, other constitutional courts have
embraced case-by-case balancing as the defining method of free speech
adjudication. The approaches taken by the European Court and the
Canadian Court are introduced here in order to lay the foundation for an
analysis of recent First Amendment adjudication.
A.

THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS' THREE-PART BALANCING
INQUIRY

Article io of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention") defines
freedom of expression for the European Court. 6 Unlike the First
Amendment, the plain langague of Article io is not categorical.' 7 Rather,
the right to freedom of expression, inclusive of the right to "hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority" is "subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society."' 8 Such conditions, restrictions, or
13. Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in the
United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 198 (20O).
14. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 50 (majority opinion).
15. Beschle, supra note 13, at 189.
I6. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. io, Nov. 4, i95o, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
17. See id.
18. Id.
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penalties are necessary for reasons including, inter alia, national security,
public safety, prevention of crime, protection of health or morals, and the
protection of the reputation or rights of others. 9
This binary constitutional construction therefore calls for the
European Court to consider the freedom of expression in light of proper
restrictions on its exercise. Unsurprisingly, this led the European Court,
in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, to adopt and employ an explicit
balancing test under Article

10.20

The balancing inquiry described in

Sunday Times is three-tiered; failure at any tier renders the restriction
unconstitutional in light of the European Convention.' First, the court
must ask whether the interference was "prescribed by law." 2 If so, the
inquiry turns to whether the interference had aims that are "legitimate
under Article io section 2." " Finally, the court asks whether the
interference was "necessary in a democratic society."24 In order to
determine whether an interference is necessary, the court considers
whether it corresponded to a "'pressing social need,' whether it was
'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,' [and] whether the reasons
given by the national authorities are 'relevant and sufficient under
Article i0 section 2...... "Central to this determination is the
proportionality of the interference in securing the legitimate aim.',6
B.

THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE OAKES TEST

Similar to the United States Constitution, freedom of expression in
Canada is enunciated in categorical language. Section 2 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Canadian Charter") states,
"[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms.., freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression.' 27 All fundamental freedoms
enshrined in the Canadian Charter, however, are limited under Article I:
"only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. '' .8

Faced with two sections that relate to freedom of expressionArticle i's universal limiting principle of constitutionality and Article 2's
direct guarantee of freedom-the Canadian Court has developed a
i9.
20.
21.
22.

Id.

The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1979).
Id. at 145.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
25. Id. at

62.

26. CLARE OvEy & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS

222

(4th ed. 2006).
27. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. II, § 2

(U.K.).
28. Id. at § i.
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balancing jurisprudence similar to that of the European Court. The
Canadian Court explained its balancing approach to Article 2
controversies in R. v. Keegstra.29 Citing the test developed under different
circumstances in R. v. Oakes," the Canadian Court asks (i) whether the
limitations proscribed on free speech are "rationally connected to the
objective"; (2) whether the means adopted limit the freedom of speech
"as little as possible"; and (3) whether the effects of the measure are
proportionate to the achievement of an objective of "sufficient
importance."'"
The European and Canadian methods of free speech jurisprudence
provide an underutilized, yet powerful lens through which to consider
the U.S. Supreme Court's hate speech adjudication in the context of
statutes restricting cross burning. The analysis of those cases will reveal
the extent to which balancing inquiries similar to those enumerated in
Sunday Times and Oakes already lurk in the shadows of so-called
categorical considerations.3 2
III. CRACKS IN
A.

R.A

THE FOUNDATION OF CATEGORIZATION

. V. ST. PAUL AND SHIFTING CATEGORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Justice Scalia's opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Pau 33 represents a
significant erosion of the categorical jurisprudence that had marked the
United States Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence up until
that point.34 When the categorical faqade is temporarily removed, the
balancing approach underpinning the categorical definitions is revealed.
R.A.V. concerned the constitutionality of a St. Paul statute making it
a misdemeanor to place on public or private property symbols known to
cause anger "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."35 A
burning cross is specifically mentioned as one such symbol. 6 The
petitioner challenged his prosecution under the statute on the basis that
the statute was "overbroad and impermissibly content based and
therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment."37 The Court
R. v. Keegstra, [199O] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
3 . R. v. Oakes, [1986]1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
31. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 735 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See generally Beschle, supra note 13.
29.
o

33. 505 U.S. 377 (2003).

34. It is ironic that Justice Scalia utilizes elements, albeit implicitly, of a balancing inquiry in his
opinion. In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., Scalia scoffed at the "process...
ordinarily called 'balancing,"' stating that "the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the
interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy." 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
36. See id.
37. Id.
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unanimously declared the statute unconstitutional." Justice Scalia's
majority opinion, however, garnered only five votes, and three separate
concurring opinions were written, indicating that something more than
the ultimate decision was at stake.
Scalia began by acknowledging the Court's restrictions on the
seemingly absolute nature of the First Amendment.39 However, instead
of trying to fit the statute in question into formerly defined categorical
exclusions, Scalia suggested that such categories were false constructions
layered over the real reasons for limiting the First Amendment.4" To say
that certain categories of speech lie outside First Amendment protection,
he wrote, is "no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated
shorthand characterizing obscenity 'as not being speech at all.".'4 '
However, momentarily poised on the brink of advocating for a new
First Amendment jurisprudence, Scalia makes a quick retreat into
categorical considerations, muddying the waters that he had momentarily
cleared. Enumerating a list of examples distinguishing permissible
prohibitions on speech by the state from those that infringe on First
Amendment guarantees,42 Scalia states that "[w]hen the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class
of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or
viewpoint discrimination exists."'43 Thus, viewpoint discrimination
becomes a category of non-proscribable speech within a category of
speech that otherwise could be proscribed under the First Amendment.
Scalia also distinguishes permissible proscriptions on prurient speech
from impermissible proscriptions on prurient speech only when offensive
political messages are involved;' permissible prohibitions on threats of
violence to the President from impermissible proscriptions on threats
against the President only if they mention his policy on aid to inner
cities;45 and permissible proscriptions on advertising in one industry but
not in others due to the risk of fraud from impermissible proscriptions on
advertising
that only objects to the depiction of men in a demeaning
4
fashion.46

38. Id. at 378.
39. Id. at 382-83 (stating that "our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas which are 'of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality' (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942)).
40. See id. at 383-84.
41. Id. at 383 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Pornographyand the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J.
589, 615 n.146).
42. Id. at 388-89.
43. Id. at 388.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 388-89.
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This passage provokes Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, to
warn that the majority4 opinion will lead to a new form of First
Amendment absolutism:
[W]hile the Court rejects the "all-or-nothing-at-all" nature of the
categorical approach, it promptly embraces an absolutism of its own:
Within a particular "proscribable" category of expression, the Court
holds, a government must either proscribe all speech or no speech at
all. 48

In addition, Stevens expressed skepticism about any categorical
approach to the First Amendment.49 While he admits that a categorical
approach has appeal in creating "safe harbors for governments and
speakers alike," it "inevitably give[s] rise only to fuzzy boundaries" and
undervalues the importance of context when evaluating expression."
In the end, Scalia declares the categorically-based considerations
that characterized cases prior to R.A.V. -obscenity, defamation,
"fighting words," and the like-inapt in this context, only to replace
them with an even more abstract set of categories.' Speech proscribed
based on the entire class of speech itself may be permissible, whereas
idea or viewpoint based prohibitions on subcategories of the larger class
of speech are not.52 It is as if speech is a set of Russian matryoshka dolls;
proscription must be applied to the parent doll, and is therefore also
applied to each of the child dolls nested within. "What we have here,"
Scalia concludes, "is not a prohibition of fighting words that are directed
against certain persons or groups (which would be facially valid if it met
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause); but rather, a
prohibition of fighting words that contain . .

.

messages of 'bias-

motivated' hatred."53 A statute cannot ban only a limited selection of
fighting words that insult on the basis of creed, color, religion or gender;
it must ban all or none. 4 No child matryoshka doll may suffer the stigma
of proscription unaccompanied by her parent.
The question left unanswered by Scalia (and by the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence in general) is how to determine what makes a
particular class of statements proscribable in light of the absolute
language of the First Amendment. How did obscenity, threats of
violence, advertising, and other categories of speech become recognized
as mother dolls, parent classes of speech that may be proscribed under

47. See id. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 419.
49. Id. at426.
50. Id.
51. See id. at383 (majority opinion).
52. See id. at 3 88.
53. Id. at 392.
54. Seeid. at391.
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the First Amendment? The categories are not related to any
constitutional text, or to the framers' intent.
The theory expressed in this paper is that the Court defines these
proscribable categories, at least in part, through behind-the-curtains
balancing, weighing the reasons for the prohibition in question against
the reasons given by the state for the prohibition. 5 Laws can regulate
threats of violence (or obscenity, or advertising) because the freedom to
threaten violence (or engage in obscenity, or falsely advertise) is less
important than the social fabric that would be damaged by such free
expression. Professor Beschle calls this process one of categorization as a
means of balancing,: whereby "the Court has been able to reconcile
absolutism ...with the practical need to balance rights and interests (in
the process of categorizing, rather than balancing in each case)."57 This
process of "categorical balancing"' removes the balancing inquiry from
the Court's overt considerations, and it occurs "on a wholesale, rather
than a retail level."59 As Beschle concludes: "The choice is not between
whether or not to use balancing, but rather what form the balancing will
take."" Ultimately, R.A. V. serves only to refine the method by which the
Court applies its categorical definitions; and while the curtain was
temporarily pulled back to reveal the machinery of the decision-making
process, thereafter it was rapidly and forcefully closed.
However, in the last few lines of his opinion, Scalia reveals the
balancing inquiry at work in his decision. 6' After a dizzying discussion of
different types of categories and the proper means of analyzing
restrictions on those categories under the First Amendment, he comes to
"[t]he

dispositive

question

in this case[,]

.

.

.

whether content

discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling
issue is one of proportionality-as in
interests.", 6' For Scalia, the ultimate
64
6
Sunday Times" and Keegstra.

B.

BLACK AND STEPS TOWARDS A MORE EXPLICIT BALANCING INQUIRY

In the wake of R.A.V., the Court was confronted with another cross-

55. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (196i) (stating that the Court has
upheld statutes that narrow First Amendment rights when First Amendment rights are justified by
subordinating governmental interests).
56. Beschle, supra note 13, at 191.

57- Id.
8. See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1138 & n.175
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Beschle, supra note 13, at 227.

6o. Id.
61. See R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992).
62. Id.

63. See OVEY & WHrrE, supranote 26.
64. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
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burning case, Virginia v. Black.6' The statute in question in Black
contained two provisions: it made burning a cross with the intent to
intimidate a felony, and it defined the burning of a cross as prima facie
evidence of an attempt to intimidate. 66 In Black, unlike in R.A.V., some
Justices believed the statute to be constitutional; in fact, if not for the
statutory definition of cross burning as a prima facie attempt to
intimidate, a majority would likely have found the statute a valid
proscription on speech with the intent to intimidate. 67 The statute fell due
to the prima facie provision, which a plurality of the Court held unfairly
68
presumed that all cross burning was done with the intent to intimidate.
Looking at Black in the context of First Amendment balancing,
there are three notable aspects of O'Connor's opinion for the plurality.
First, the point and counterpoint structure of the introduction to Part
III(A) of the opinion reads as if lifted directly from a European Court
decision." In order to provide the legal framework for analyzing the
statute in question, O'Connor starts with a paragraph about the First
Amendment's absolute prohibition on laws abridging free speech.7" This
absolutism is then contextualized by the first sentence of the second
paragraph: "The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however,
are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the
Constitution." 7' The content of this section of the opinion is
unremarkable; it is a simple restatement of the constitutional and
common law doctrines that define the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. However, the structure of these few paragraphs suggests a
jurisprudential approach nearly in sync with that of the European
Court.72 Structurally, one is able to see the process of balancing at work;
65. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).

66. Id. at 348.
67. See id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
68. Justice Thomas' dissent applies reasoning parallel to the "Auschwitz lie" in Germany. See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 13, 1994, 90 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 241 (F.R.G) [hereinafter Holocaust Denial Case],
translated in Foreign Law Translations, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/

work-new/german/case.php?id=621 (last visited Nov. 22, 2007). Both Thomas' dissent and the opinion
in the Holocaust Denial Case are instances where the particular history and background of
persecution informs a categorical ban on speech meant to remind citizens of the terror of that
persecution (cross burning) or deny that the persecution happened (Holocaust denial). While a fully
considered comparison of Thomas' dissent with the Holocaust Denial Case is beyond the scope of this
inquiry, it is an interesting example of how the usual balancing approach used by the BverfG is
eschewed in this case for an approach akin to Thomas' conservative originalist jurisprudence.
69. CompareBlack, 538 U.S. at 358, with Part II, supra.
70. Black, 538 U.S. at 358.
71. Id.

72. It is unsurprising that Justice O'Connor's opinion borrows structurally, as well as
substantively, from the European Court. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why
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the absolute guarantee of the First Amendment must be balanced against
the limitations imposed on that absolute. While this structural
consideration may seem unimportant and obvious, it provides the
foundation for engaging in a balancing inquiry.
73
Second, the context-sensitive historical approach to the decision
provides material to enable the balancing inquiry to be more than mere
opinion. 4 As if responding to Justice Stevens' criticism of the context-less
categorical approach in R.A. V.," O'Connor traces cross burning as far
back as 14th century Scotland and considers its place in and throughout
American history." The historical analysis lays the groundwork for a
discussion of the multiple meanings of cross burning, from its birth as
theatrical expression in medieval Scotland,' to its uses by the Ku Klux
Clan as "a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending violence, '' 78 a
"potent symbol[] of shared group identity and ideology, ' 79 and as "a sign
of celebration and ceremony."' ° This rich consideration of the power and
multiple meanings of cross burning as symbolic expression provides
O'Connor with strong support for two conclusions: (i) that "a burning
cross does not inevitably convey a message of intimidation," but (2) that
"when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more
powerful."'" The implication of these conclusions is that context matters.
The importance of this contextualized historical inquiry provides
weight to the balancing of interests under the First Amendment. As
Professor Timothy Zick explains: "This may seem a tremendous
expenditure of energy for a ritual which many would immediately
interpret as racist and threatening .... But note that the Court recovered

several plausible meanings for the gesture of cross burning."' This
ethnographic analysis, in Zick's view, provides the Court with something
,'more than presuppositions or gut feelings" on which to base their

American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, Address Before the American
College of Trial Lawyers (Spring 1997), in INT'L JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2 ("1think that 1, and
the other justices [sic] of the U.S. Supreme Court, will find ourselves looking more frequently to the
decisions of other constitutional courts.... They have struggled with the same basic constitutional
questions that we have ....
").
73. Black, 538 U.S. at 352.
74. This also serves as a response to Justice Black's fear of the balancing away of First
Amendment freedoms.
75. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 426 (1992) (Stevens, J.,concurring in judgment);

see also supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
76. Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57.

77. Id. at 352.
78. Id. at 354.
79. Id. at 356.
8o. Id.
81. Id. at 357.
82. Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First
Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2347 (2004).
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evaluation of "polysemous symbols. '' 8, O'Connor's carefully considered
historical analysis of cross burning "ensures that there is a basis,
grounded in evidence, for the Court's interpretation of symbolic
meaning. '" 4 Professor Frederick Schauer argues that this deep analysis,
usually hidden but made explicit in Black, is the most logical explanation
for the actual boundaries of the First Amendment.58 Rather than the86
categorical considerations on which the Court bases its jurisprudence,
the actual basis for its decisions is more likely "the political, sociological,
cultural, historical, psychological, and economic milieu87in which the First
Amendment exists and out of which it has developed.
The end result of the contextualized consideration of the multiple
available meanings of cross burning is that the prima facie evidence
provision in the statute in question is invalid because it "makes no effort
to distinguish among these different types of cross burnings." 88 This
insight reveals the third point of interest in O'Connor's opinion, the
point at which Black reveals a radical shift towards an explicit case-bycase
First
Amendment
balancing jurisprudence,
embracing
considerations of proportionality in all but name. O'Connor writes: "It is
apparent that the provision as so inter reted would create an
unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas." The prima facie evidence
provision of the statute is overbroad, blurring the line between
permissible and impermissible expression.' As such, "the provision chills
constitutionally protected political speech because of the possibility that
a State will prosecute - and potentially convict - somebody engaging

only in lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect."'" The historical examination of cross burning in
Part II of the opinion is directly brought to bear on its holding: the prima
facie provision is criticized for failing to distinguish between different
meanings expressed by cross burning. 9 The statute conflates the meaning
of cross burning done in private with that done in public; cross burning
directed at like-minded believers with that directed at an individual who
is the object of the group's scorn; cross burning done in a location where
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExploration of
ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787 (2004).

86. See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (being buoyed by historical analysis, O'Connor reverts to
the safe ground of categorical inquiry, ultimately deciding whether the statute in question proscribes
speech that is a "true threat," as defined in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774
(1994)).

87. Schauer, supra note 85.
88. Black, 538 U.S. at 366.
89. Id. at 365 (internal citation omitted).
o. See id.
i
9 . Id.
92. See id.
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the property owner has given permission with cross burning done in the
course of trespassing.93 As such, there is too much danger that the prima
facie provision will force jurors to err on the side of conviction.94
O'Connor's statement that the First Amendment does not permit
"ignor[ing] all of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide
whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate"'95 is a clear
indication of 96 the need for proportionality in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
By echoing aspects of European Court and Canadian Court freedom
of speech balancing inquiries, Black suggests that the Court may be
ready to fully adopt a new First Amendment jurisprudence, one that
embraces interpretation and explicitly acknowledges balancing of the
protections of the First Amendment against legitimate legislative
interests as the way to adjudicate First Amendment cases.
C. R.A.V,

BLACK, AND WHERE THE COURT STANDS

Most clear from R.A. V. and Black is that the Court is searching for
new ways to decide the old problem of the extent to which a state can
regulate hateful expression. Surprisingly,97 it was Justice Scalia who laid
the foundation for a case-by-case balancing test in R.A.V. by criticizing
the categories delineated by prior Court decisions. Those prior decisions
had placed categories of words-obscenity, defamation and fighting
words-beyond the reach of First Amendment protection. 8 Scalia also
highlighted the proportionality of the St. Paul statute in R.A.V. as the
determinative factor in his decision, striking down the statute because it
was not reasonably necessary to furthering St. Paul's legitimate
interests. 99 Scalia's opinion had the effect of echoing, whether
intentionally or not, similar considerations mandated by the Sunday
Times and Oakes tests. In Black, O'Connor undertook a deep contextual
analysis of cross burning,'" which allowed her to decide the First
Amendment question at issue on the basis of a richly informed
proportionality analysis.'"' Further, the point-counterpoint formula
adopted in Section III(A) of O'Connor's opinion provides the underlying
93. See id. at 365-66.
94. Id. at 366.
95. Id. at 367.
96. Despite embracing substantially similar reasoning, at times, to his own opinion in R.A.V.particularly with relation to a proportionality analysis-Justice Scalia dissented in part from Justice
O'Connor's opinion. The prima facie portion of the statute was not enough to invalidate the entire
statute in his opinion, as a defendant would still be offered the opportunity to rebut the presumption.
See id. at 367-70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part).
97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

98. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,383,386 (1992).
99. Id. at 395-96.
ioo. Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57.
ioi. Id. at 365-67.
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skeletal structure for a balancing inquiry. It almost appears as if the
opinion in Black could have been issued by the European Court or the
Canadian Court.
IV.

TOWARDS EXPLICIT FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING JURISPRUDENCE

A.

THE NEED FOR A NEW FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

R.A. V. and Black established a foundation sufficient to embrace an
explicit case-by-case First Amendment balancing test. As Beschle
comments, we are in the midst of "a perhaps unacknowledged drift on
the part of the United States Supreme Court toward the use of
Canadian-style balancing in free speech cases, and away from bright-line
tests with sharply-drawn categorical boundaries."'" Before calling for
that drift to be acknowledged and adopted, it is worth pausing to
consider whether there is any advantage to be gained by utilizing a caseby-case balancing approach.'"
One thing that is clear about current First Amendment
jurisprudence is that it is profoundly unclear. Justice Stevens argues that
the Supreme Court has sacrificed subtlety for clarity, at the very least
providing safe harbor for speakers and legislators alike.'" However, it is
difficult to see the clarity in an approach that eschews guiding principles
for a patchwork series of considerations that must be applied by analogy
to new controversies that arise. 5 There are at least three separate
communities to whom clarity is important: (i) legislators who must
consider the meaning of the First Amendment as expounded by the
Court in order to create law that is within those bounds; (2) citizens who
want to challenge unconstitutional constraints on their freedom of
expression; and (3) judges who are bound to apply the law as interpreted
by the Court. The muddiness of current First Amendment law, especially
as it concerns controversial expression, hinders the efforts of all three. As
a result, legislatures are left without clear guidance on whether it is legal
to create legislation prohibiting not only cross burning, but also hate
speech in general; citizens are left unsure whether their rights are being
violated as speakers and as objects of hate speech; and lower courts are
left to attempt to apply what has become an abstracted, narrowlytailored categorical jurisprudence to situations that do not fit cleanly
within the established categories.
Additionally, R.A.V. and Black show how little has been resolved.
Beschle, supra note 13, at i9o.
103. A fully considered examination is beyond the scope of this Note.
104. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 426.
105. See, e.g., Julie Hilden, The Supreme Court Confronts Cross-Burningand the First Amendment
Once Again, Because it Failed to Make This Knotty Area of Law Clear the First Time, FINDLAW, Nov.
102.

15, 2002, http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/hilden/2oo21115.html.
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Both decisions are written as narrowly as possible; in fact, it is precisely
the narrowly applied reasoning of R.A.V. that necessitated Black in the
first place,' and Black concludes by "leav[ing] open" the possibility that
the lower court, on remand, may "interpret the provision in a manner
different from that so far set forth in order to avoid the constitutional
objections we have described."" Thus, a lower court may interpret the
statute differently so as to avoid constitutional objections described by
the Court, but in so doing it may raise new constitutional problems.
Further, it is doubtful that the Court's current First Amendment
jurisprudence provides a blueprint flexible enough and insightful enough
to deal with as-yet unimagined restrictions on the First Amendment. The
Court is forced to attempt to induce a set of general principles from
decisions dealing with individualized situations, and worse, lower courts
are forced to do the same.
B.

A

PROPOSED FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST

Because R.A. V. and Black suggest an overlap with some of the
factors considered in the Sunday Times and Oakes tests,"' it is logical to
base a First Amendment balancing test on the approaches that are
already being utilized by the Court-whether with confidence or
hesitation. In so doing, the goal is to make use of existent Supreme Court
First Amendment jurisprudence in a novel way, rather than to discard
precedent in favor of a wholly new set of considerations.
Based on these considerations, the following two-step balancing
inquiry is proposed. Failure to meet either one of the two steps in the
inquiry will result in the Court overturning a restriction on speech for
violating the First Amendment. On the other hand, if the restriction is
justified under both steps of the inquiry, such a restriction should be
upheld.
i. Are the Limits Placed on Expression Legitimate and of
Sufficient Importance to Justify Governmental Intrusion on the
Protection of Expression as Embodied in the FirstAmendment?
Borrowing from Professor Knechtle, there are "two predominant
factors that should be considered" at the first stage of the balancing
inquiry: "(i) historical accounts of ethnic, racial and religious violence,
' 9
genocide, and discriminatory practices; and (2) jurisprudential history."'
The Court is particularly adept at considering its jurisprudential history;
our common law is built upon precisely such considerations. In this way,
precedent will still play an important role in First Amendment

io6.
lO7.
io8.
1o9.

See id.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003).
See supra Part II.
John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539,552 (2006).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:407

jurisprudence, but it will do so in a way that forces the judge to consider
the shared qualities of the aims that the Supreme Court has found
legitimate. Finding commonalities in restrictions on obscenity, fighting
words, defamation and other constitutionally proscribed areas of speech
will prove a difficult task; one made more difficult because of the
unilateral commandment of the First Amendment (in contrast to the
European Convention, which spells out acceptable reasons that
expression may be limited)."'
The Canadian model provides insight into how such a general
inquiry may be made more specific to each situation. The Canadian
Constitution provides all of the freedoms contained therein, including
the freedom of expression, "subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society ..... While the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights
provide no parallel provision, it is possible to regard the Supreme Court's
First Amendment decisions, which have determined what speech may be
proscribed, as having created a common law doctrine of reasonable
limitations demonstrably justified in our free and democratic society,
similar to Article i of the Canadian Constitution.
With regard to the contextualized accounting of ethnic, racial and
religious violence, genocide, and discriminatory practices, Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Black provides an example of the ability of the
Court to consider the historical context that provides deep meaning to
particular modes of expression. Far from being controversial, Professor
Jackson explains that this inquiry "is similar to ones that U.S.
constitutional cases frequently address .... The shift is illustrated by the
radically different attitudes R.A. V. and Black display towards the history
of cross burning. Whereas in R.A.V., "both majority and dissenting
opinions rely almost entirely on past U.S. case precedents in resolving
the difficult constitutional questions presented,""..3 Part II of O'Connor's
opinion in Black parallels the Canadian Court's "context-specific
approach.""..4 Black takes the step of engaging in a normative valuation of
cross burning: "The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross
burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a
particularly virulent form of intimidation."..5 In this aspect, Black
contrasts greatly with R.A.V, where "the majority opinion says little
i1O. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1o (2), Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
iii. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. II, § 2
(U.K.).
112. Jackson, supra note 5, at 6o8.
113. Id. at612.
114. See id.
115. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,344 (2003).
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6
about the possible value of governmental opposition to hate speech."",
Black's normative pronouncement is not, however, mere judicial whimsy.
Instead, it is the product of the ethnographic historical accounting of
cross burning undertaken in the opinion.
In addition to helping the Court face First Amendment questions
that have yet to be conclusively resolved, this approach will provide the
Court with a positive principle to guide its First Amendment
jurisprudence when confronted with new and novel situations, rather
than parceled categories of speech into which the restriction at issue must
be properly placed."7 Precedent will serve to give the principle shape, but
it will no longer give rise to categorical borders within which the Court
must find room for exceptions to the First Amendment's guarantees. In
this way, shape would be given to an otherwise broad, abstract principle,
and categories would take a place subordinate to, rather than as the sole
expressions of, a governing principle.

Are the Restrictions on Expression Proportionateto the Purpose
for the Restrictions?
If the Court finds that the limits placed on the freedom of expression
are legitimate and of sufficient importance to justify governmental
intrusion on the protection of expression as embodied in the First
Amendment, the Court then moves to the second inquiry. Given that the
limits are justified, the Court must inquire whether they are no more
invasive on the protections afforded citizens under the First Amendment
than necessary.
This inquiry has a firmly established place in Supreme Court
jurisprudence in general, and in First Amendment jurisprudence in
particular, usually under the guise of a narrow tailoring requirement. As
Professor Jackson states:
While the language of 'proportionality' is not generally used in the
United States, the underlying questions-involving the degree of fit
between the claimed objective and the means chosen, and a concern
for whether the intrusion on rights or interests is excessive in relation
to the purpose-are already an important part of some fields ' of
8 U.S.
constitutional law, especially equal protection, and free speech.
2.

Both R.A.V. and Black provide examples of proportionality
inquiries. Both Scalia and O'Connor ultimately point out that the
restrictions embraced by the statutes are not proportionate to the goal
the restrictions seek to attain. ' In other words, the means chosennamely a statutory presumption of the intent to intimidate-was not

116. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 613.
117. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
I8.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 6o9.
119. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,395-96 (1992); Black, 538 U.S. at 365-67.
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proportionate to the goal of combating expression, specifically cross
burning, done with the intent to intimidate.
Evidence of the determinative role played by proportionality in
Black is O'Connor's admission in the opinion's penultimate paragraph
that the Court's opinion is to be read narrowly. "[A]ll we hold is that
because of . . . the prima facie evidence provision given by the jury
instruction, the provision makes the statute facially invalid at this
point ..... Further, a plurality of the Court, in joining O'Connor's opinion,
implicitly stated that if the statute were severable, the main clause would
likely have been constitutional, in that it would likely be proportionate to
the legitimate ends Virginia seeks to achieve. 2 '
It should not come as a surprise that proportionality was embraced
by the plurality in Black. As Professor Beatty explains, "Proportionality
is a universal criterion of constitutionality ..... When applied to First
Amendment analysis, proportionality encourages a shift in scope from
"spheres of personal autonomy where the sovereignty of the individual is
absolute and unconditional," to an "emphasis on the duties governments
owe to those who are subject to their rule.' '23 This shift is present in
Black. The plurality did not challenge Virginia's attempt to outlaw cross
burnings done with an intent to intimidate. "Virginia may choose to
regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning's
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence ...
Thus... a State [may] choose to prohibit only those forms of
intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear or bodily harm.' 24
O'Connor moved the conversation of the First Amendment's protections
away from the prohibition of government intervention, towards a vision
of government as having a proactive duty to protect citizens under the
First Amendment's guidance. Even though the statute was struck down
for being disproportionate to the aims achieved, the implicit
consideration of proportionality had already shifted the Court towards a
new consideration of the role of government vis-A-vis the First
Amendment.
C.

ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING
INQUIRY

Though a comprehensive response to the challenges of adopting an
explicit First Amendment balancing inquiry and to the criticism such a
test would undoubtedly engender is beyond the confines of this paper, I
will address several of the anticipated objections.
120. Black, 538 U.S. at 367.
12 1.

See id.

122. DAVID
123.

Id. at

M.

BEATrY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 162 (2004).

174.

124. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
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First, many scholars and judges believe that categorical rules lead to
greater predictability of results than balancing tests.' 5 Categorical rules
impose a regime on the Court that yields greater predictability, they
argue, than judgments that are a result of open-ended, multi-factored
standards. , 6 However, this conclusion is at least partially based on the
assumption that balancing tests are not capable of leading to "rules" that
can be applied in future cases. That assumption is not necessarily true.
"[E]ither formalist or 'balancing' reasoning might produce a formal
rule.' ' 27 There is nothing restraining the Court from establishing a set of
standards employed in the course of utilizing a balancing inquiry to
arrive at decisions. Further, that is the role of the Court's wellestablished First Amendment jurisprudence; categories that have
outlived their usefulness as jurisprudential destinations still have much
import as guidelines to the means of employing the balancing inquiry.
Further, predictability of a given result is not as much of an issue in
cases that probe at the edges of the First Amendment, and any cases that
reach the Court at this point in its history must demand an investigation
of those edges. Because cases that reach the Supreme Court are at the
edges of First Amendment jurisprudence, their results are frequently
unpredictable independent of the jurisprudential analysis adopted. More
important than predictability of the final judgment in such cases is the
predictability of the reasoning process, or a predictable method of
adjudication that can be carried out by the lower courts. Ultimately the
process, and not the end product, is what matters. "What Keegstra
illustrates is that constitutional reasoning in difficult cases can be
illuminatingly carried out under the 'proportionality' test and that this
approach has some advantages over alternative styles of reasoning.' 2.8
Second, Justice Black feared that formerly entrenched rights will be
"'balanced' away whenever a majority of this Court thinks that a State
might have interests sufficient to justify abridgment of those
freedoms.' 2' 9 This fear has been more recently echoed by other Justices,
particularly those usually associated with the Court's conservative wing,
who perhaps believe that categorical jurisprudence is inherently more
conservative than balancing tests. However, Professor Sullivan argues
that "[n]either the categorization/conservative nor the balancing/liberal
connection is borne out.""'3 Sullivan points to the Warren Court's

125. Jackson, supra note 5, at 622.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 621 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, i i i HARV.
L. REV. 54, 8o-8I (I997) (emphasis omitted)).
128. Id. at 623.
129. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (Black, J., dissenting).
130. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 294 (1992).
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embrace of categorical jurisprudence because it was "more likely to
protect expression in crisis times. ' '3. Further evidence can be found in
examining the results of European Court freedom of expression
decisions, reached using an explicit balancing approach. In a selection of
seven freedom of expression cases dating from 1979 to 2005, the
European Court did not "balance away" the right in five of seven cases'32
and the only unanimous decisions were those which found the state in
violation.'33 Thus, balancing does not invariably lead to an erosion of
rights. In terms of result-oriented fears, the mode of adjudication is
trumped by the socio-political beliefs held by those on the bench.'34
Balancing analyses do not
make restrictions on the First Amendment's
35
guarantees more likely.'

Finally, ever since Marbury, 36 the Court has struggled with the
counter-majoritarian dilemma: how the Court, as an unelected body, can
justify overturning laws passed by democratically elected representatives.
While the idea may seem counterintuitive, it is possible that a
proportionality balancing test will respond to, rather than further
inflame, the challenge the Court faces in justifying its opinions to
politicians and the citizenry.
Categorical jurisprudence provides the Court with the illusion of
decisionmaking by way of objective "taxonom[y]."' 37 Chief Justice
Roberts favorably likened judging to "umpiring" during his confirmation
hearing. '8 In the context of the First Amendment, "umpiring"
presumably suggests determining whether or not a given restriction fits
within an already established category. However, the process of nearobjective umpiring ignores, inter alia, the process of creating the
categories in the first place. Categorical exceptions to the First
Amendment are not enshrined in the Constitution. Rather, they are
judicial invention, precisely the kind of legislating from the bench that
enflames animosity towards the Court's anti-democratic power.
Therefore, while categorization may provide cover for lower court judges
131. Id. at 294-95.
132. Cumpana & Mazare v. Romania, 2004 -XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 96; Lehideux & Isorni v. France,
i998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2864, 2887; Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1994); Castells
v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1992); The Sunday Times Case, 3o Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6
('979).
133. Cumpana & Mazare v. Romania, 200 4 -XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 96; Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct.

H.R. (ser. A) at 8
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

(1992).

See Sullivan, supra note 13o, at 294-95.
See id.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
See Sullivan, supra note 130, at 293.
John Roberts, Nominee for Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Address
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 12, 2005), in USATDAY.COM, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/washington/2oo5-o9-12-roberts-fulltextx.htm
("Judges
are
like
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them.").
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who wish to avoid public scrutiny, it does not protect Supreme Court
Justices, who preside over cases that primarily present new, as-yet
unconsidered and unaccounted for challenges.
On the other hand, by bringing to the forefront the principles that
underlie previously delineated categories and using those principles as
the guiding considerations in a balancing inquiry, the Court can provide
citizens and our elected representatives with a clearer understanding of
the reasons underlying their decisions. The Court would be forced to
"explicitly identify competing . . . values and make comparative
normative assessments about those values . . . . "' This would lead to a

"transparency of reasoning" and provide "a useful tool for making hard
judgments in distinguishing those restrictions that are demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society and those that threaten the
continuance of that free and democratic society.' 4 ° Clarity may be the
most powerful response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma available to
the Court.
CONCLUSION

Case-by-case balancing already informs the Supreme Court as it
decides hate speech cases that exist at the fringe of First Amendment
jurisprudence. In particular, Justice Scalia in R.A. V., and more explicitly,
Justice O'Connor in Black adopted modes of inquiry that at the very
least mirror, if not borrow from, European and Canadian modes of
constitutional jurisprudence. However, the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence still engenders tremendous confusion in the lower courts,
in state legislatures, and among citizens protected by the First
Amendment's guarantees. As such, I propose a two-pronged First
Amendment balancing test that would require the Court to ask (I)
whether the limits placed on expression are legitimate and of sufficient
importance to justify governmental intrusion on the protection of
expression as embodied in the First Amendment; and (2) whether the
restrictions on expression are proportionate to the purpose for the
restrictions. This inquiry mirrors the implicit balancing that has already
emerged in the context of First Amendment jurisprudence, and its
emergence may help provide the Court with both the necessary flexibility
to address future cases and with more powerful and clearly justifiable
bases for its First Amendment decisions.

139. Jackson, supra note 5, at 612.
140. ld. at 617 (internal citations omitted).
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